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Summary findings
AS many East Asian countries plunged into economic  In contrast, deviations of control  from cash-flow rights
decline, the structure of concentrated ownership and  --  through the use of dual-class shares, pyramiding, and
associated corporate governance, along with weak  cross-holdings - are associated with lower market
corporate performance, have been blamed for the crisis.  values. This is especially true for corporations under
There is little empiricai evidence, however, of the nature  famiky  control and, in Japan, tinder the control of widely
of ownership structures in East Asia and their  held financial institutions.
relationship to corporate performance in the typical East  They conclude that the risk of expropriation  is the
Asian environment (where inefficient judicial systems,  major principal-agent problem for large corporationls, as
and weak property and shiareholder rights are common).  suggested by La Porta and colleagues (1999).
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang examine evidence  The degree to which certain ownership structures are
of the expropriation  of minority shareholders for 2,658  associated with expropriation  depends on country-
corporations in nine East Asian countries in 1996. They  specific circumstances. These may include the quality of
distinguish control from cash-flow r ights. They also  banking systemns,  the legal and judicial protection of
distinguish betveen  various rtpes of ultimate owners,  individual shareholders, and the degree of financial
including family, state, widely held corporations,  and  disclosure required.
widely held financial institutions.
Higher cash-flow rights are associated with higher
market values, consistent with Jensen and Meckling
(I 976).
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1.  Introduction
As many East Asian countries have plunged into a period of economic decline, policy
advisers have pointed to the ownership concentration structure of corporations and  associated
corporate governance as one of the main culprits for the crisis  and the weak performance of
corporations.!  Little  empirical  evidence  exists,  however,  on  the  nature  of  the  ownership
structures in East Asia  and its relation to corporate perfornance  under  the typical East Asian
external environment, often including weak property and shareholders' rights, inefficient judicial
systems, and corruption.  This study is a first attempt to investigate this nexus.  Using a unique,
new data-set of 2,658 East Asian corporations in  1996, the year before the regional financial
crisis, we study the relation between the concentration of cash-flow rights and control rights and
the type of block ownership (family, state, widely-held financial institutions, and widely-held
corporations), on the one hand, and corporate valuation, on the other hand.  We also examine the
evidence on minority shareholders' expropriation in East Asian corporations.
We find large differences in the concentration of cash-flow and control rights across the
nine East Asian countries. Japanese and Taiwanese firms have the least concentrated ownership,
on average only 6.90 (10.33) and 15.98 (18.96) percent of the total cash-flow (control) rights in
these two countries is in the hands of the largest block-holder.  In contrast, Thai, Indonesian, and
Hong Kong fmns  have the most  ownership concentration in  the hands  of the largest block-
I See, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Prowse (1998). Recovery plans for the corporate sector in East
Asia are based on the need to change corporate governance, enhance property rights, minority rights, limit insider-
transactions, and improve disclosure (World Bank, 1998).
2holder,  32.84  (35.25),  25.61  (33.68),  24.30  (28.08)  percent  of  cash-flow  (control)  rights
respectively.  Financial institutions  are the main owners of corporations in Japan,  controlling
around  40%  of  corporations.  The state  controls more  than  a  quarter  of  all  corporations  in
Singapore, while a third of all corporations in the Philippines are controlled by other widely-held
corporations.  We find that in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand families
have control over the majority of corporations.
In  all  countries,  control  is  enhanced  through  the  use  of  pyramid  structures,  cross-
holdings, and deviations from one-share-one-vote rules.  The ratio of cash-flow to control rights
is the smallest in Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore, 0.602, 0.784, and  0.794 respectively.  The
least difference between cash-flow and control rights is observed in  Thailand, where the ratio
between cash-flow  and control rights is  0.941. These findings  extend the previous  literature,
which has traditionally focused on deviations from one-share-one-vote rules (Wolfenzon, 1999).
We document that high concentration of cash-flow rights in the hands of block-holders is
beneficial for corporate valuation, particularly in the case of widely-held  financial institutions.
The  concentration  of  control  is  shown  to  be  negatively  associated  with  market  valuation,
particularly in the case of families and widely-held financial institutions.  In contrast, no relation
exists between the concentration of state control and market valuation and between control by
widely-held corporations and market valuation.  Adjusting for the level of control, a larger wedge
between cash-flow and control rights is associated with a declining valuation.  At the margin, a
10 percentage  points  increase  in  the ratio  of  cash-flow  to  control  rights  brings  about  a  5
percentage points  decline in  valuation.  The results  are driven by family-owned  corporations
across all East Asian countries, and corporations owned by widely-held financial institutions in
Japan.  This finding is consistent with the existing literature on the effect of keiretsu affiliation in
3Japan  (see  Weinstein  and  Yafeh,  1998 for  a  survey).  It  also  supports  the  expropriation
hypothesis in  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who argue that "as ownership gets beyond a certain
point, the large owners gain nearly full control and prefer to use firms to generate private benefits
of control that are not shared by minority shareholders" (p.759).
The paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  summarizes  the  existing  literature  on
ownership  structure  and  corporate  valuation.  Section  3  describes  the  data  sample  and  the
construction  of the variables.  Section 4  studies  the effects  of  ownership concentration  and
ownership  types  on  firm  valuation  and  investigates  the  evidence  on  small  shareholder
expropriation in East Asia.  Section 5 concludes.
2.  Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance
The research on the  topic of ownership  structures and  corporate valuation  dates back
more than sixty years to Berle  and Means (1932).  They show that  diffuse ownership yields
significant power in the hands of managers whose interests do not coincide with the interest of
shareholders. As a result, corporate resources are not used for the maximization of shareholders'
value with diffuse ownership. A more concentrated ownership can consequently lead to better
performance.  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976)  develop  a  theoretical  framework  to  show  that
increasing concentration in cash-flow rights is beneficial for corporate valuation.  One channel
can be through the reduction in transaction costs in negotiating and enforcing corporate contracts
with  various  stakeholders,  including  managers,  labor,  material  suppliers,  customers,  debt-
holders,  and  governments.  Shleifer and  Vishny (1986)  argue that  large  shareholders better
monitor managers, which in turn increases firm value.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that
the benefits from concentrated ownership may be relatively larger in countries that are generally
4less developed, where  property rights are not well  defined and/or protected  and  enforced by
judicial systems.
Studies  for  the  United  States  (e.g.,  Levy,  1983,  Lease  et  al.,  1984,  DeAngelo  and
DeAngelo,  1985, Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1986, McConnell  and  Servaes,  1990) indeed  find  a
positive relation between ownership concentration and corporate valuation.  Other US evidence
(Holdemess and Sheehan, 1988; Barclay and Holdemess, 1989) supports the argument that large
shareholders better monitor management and thereby improve firm valuation.  This relationship,
while  subject to interpretation, suggests that  better monitoring  and  reduced  agency costs are
associated with more concentrated ownership.2
There  is,  however,  evidence that  concentrated  ownership  can  harm  market  valuation.
Some studies have found, for example, an inverse U-shaped relationship between ownership by
managers and a firm's valuation and its profitability (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).  The
inverse-U  shaped  effects  of  managerial  ownership  can  be  explained  by  an  incentive-
entrenchment tradeoff (Stulz, 1988).  Direct managerial ownership is small, however, for most
East Asian corporations and empire building by unaccountable managers cannot account for the
possible negative relationship between ownership concentration and valuation.
Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997)  and  La  Porta  et  al.  (1999a)  focus  on  another  problem
associated with high ownership concentration, the conflict between large and small shareholders.
When  large  shareholders  effectively  control  corporations,  their  policies  may  result  in  the
2  Other  studies (Demsetz,  1983; Demsetz  and  Lehn,  1985)  argue that  the  relation  is spurious.  While  greater
ownership  concentration  results  in stronger  incentives  to monitor,  the expected  gain from active monitoring  and the
costs of alternative  ownership  structures  vary across finns.  If transaction costs inhibiting  investors from taking
value-maximizing  positions  in firms are low, each firm  would  have the "right" ownership  structure. Specifically,
Demsetz  and Lehn (1985) argue that distortions  in the markets for corporate control and the managerial  labor
market increase the control potential of shareholders, which lead to increases in ownership concentration.  They
5expropriation of  minority  shareholders.  The  conflicts  of interest  between  large  and  small
shareholders can be numerous, including controlling shareholders enriching themselves by not
paying out dividends, or transferring profits to other companies they control. Burkart, Gromb,
and  Panunzi  (1997)  provide  a  theoretical  model  which  suggests  that  tight  control  of  large
shareholders constitutes  an ex ante expropriation threat that reduces managerial  initiative and
non-contractible investments.  In addition, they show that ownership concentration may conflict
with  performnance-based incentive  schemes.  Wolfenzon  (1999)  interprets  the  existence  of
pyramiding  schemes as a means of expropriation of small shareholders, as it creates a wedge
between the cash-flow and control rights for large block-holders.
Empirical studies on the costs of large block-holders and the means through these costs
arise are few, however.  Some studies provide evidence for the United States and other developed
countries of conflicts of interest when control rights of the ultimate owners are significantly in
excess of cash flow rights.  Harris and Raviv (1988) document a large number of cases where
control  is  enhanced  through  the  use  of  deviations  from  one-share-one-vote  rules,  pyramid
structures being the prevalent method.  Several empirical studies interpret the large premia that
shares with superior voting rights attract as evidence of significant private benefits of control at
the expense of small shareholders.  Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1990) and Barclay and Holdemess
(1989) find some evidence of small shareholder expropriation in Sweden and the United States,
respectively, while Zingales (1994) suggests that small shareholder expropriation is significant in
Italy.  In  contrast, Malitz  (1989)  and  Slovin  and  Sushka  (1997)  find  no  evidence  of  small
shareholder expropriation in listed companies in the United States.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
provide evidence  that ownership  concentration  is positively related to the control potential  of firns,  among  other
factors. One thus needs  to be cognizant  of the two-way  link between  various  types of ownership  and  performance.
6report cases where Korean chaebols  sold their subsidiaries  to relatives of chaebol founders  at
below-market  prices.
Other studies have found that financial  institutions  which own large stake in corporate
subsidiaries reap  private benefits at  the  expense of  the  minority shareholders of  those
subsidiaries. Weinstein  and Yafeh (1998)  find that Japanese firms  belonging  to bank-controlled
keiretsus pay higher interest rates on their liabilities than unaffiliated companies.  Similar
behavior  was reported for Korea First Bank following  the collapse  of Hanbo Steel and General
Construction,  which had received  loans at above-market  rates from its creditor-owner. In 1998,
the Korean Financial  Supervisory  Commission  filed lawsuits  against  the presidents  of five other
major Korean banks on charges of illegal loans and breach of trust (Byeon, 1998).  Weiss and
Nikitin (1998)  report anecdotal  evidence  from the Czech Republic suggesting  that management
companies  of large investment  funds sold significant  ownership  packages to related companies
for a fraction  of market prices. Several studies on corporate  governance  in Japan (Aoki, 1990;
Prowse, 1992;  Hoshi, Kashyap,  and Scharfstein,  1991;  Kaplan, 1994) discuss  the adverse  effects
of keiretsu affiliation  on market valuation  of firms, and suggest that conflicts  of interest between
large and small shareholders,  along  with economic  inefficiencies,  may be the reason.
The relative  costs and benefits  of different  ownership  structures  depend  on the difference
between cash-flow  and control rights of the major block-holders.  Most studies do not, however,
attempt  to trace the ownership  of each company  to its ultimate owners  or identify those owners
by type, cash-flow  and control stake. The exception  is La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer
(1998) which documents the ultimate control structure of the largest twenty publicly traded
corporations  in 27 rich countries.  By tracing control to the ultimate owners of each company,
they find that in the majority of countries  relatively few corporations  are widely-held. For the
7four East Asian countries covered in the study, only ownership in the majority of Japanese and
Korean  corporations  is  found  to  be  widely  dispersed,  with  corporations  in  Hong  Kong
predominantly  controlled by families, and about half of the sampled companies in Singapore
controlled by the state.  They also examine the means through which control is enhanced.  They
show  that  owners  extend  their  resources  through  the  use  of  pyramiding  structures  and
management  appointments,  as  well  as  through  frequent  cross-ownership  and  the  use,  less
frequently, of dual-class shares.  Finally, they document that effective control in East Asia can be
achieved with significantly less than an absolute majority share of the stock, as the probability of
being a single controlling owner while holding only 20% of the stock is above 80%.
Following  on the methodology  developed  by La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Shleifer
(1998), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (1998) extend the analysis of ultimate control patterns to
about 3,000 publicly traded  companies in nine East Asian  countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea (South), Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand).  They find
large family  control in more than half of East Asian corporations.  Significant cross-country
differences do exist, however.  Corporations in Japan,  for example, are generally widely-held,
while  corporations in  Indonesia and  Thailand are mainly  family-controlled.  State-control is
significant in  Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,  Singapore, and  Thailand.  Smaller  firms  are more
likely controlled by families, as are older firms.  In many countries, control is enhanced through
pyramid structures, and in some countries deviations from one-share-one-vote rules. Separation
of management from ownership control is rare, with management of two-third of firms family-
related to the controlling owner, although managers do not hold much equity themselves.
Given  the  dominance  of  concentrated  cash-flow  and  control  rights  in  East Asia,  the
primary agency conflict for large corporations is  that of restricting  expropriation of minority
8shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rather than that of restricting empire building by
unaccountable managers.  The scope for this conflict, and the resulting expropriation, depends on
the wedge between cash-flow and control rights.  The East Asian corporations, for which we
have ultimate cash-flow and control information, provide a useful data set to study the evidence
on minority shareholder expropriation.
3.  Data Description
A. Cash-Flow versus Control Rights
The analysis is based  on newly-assembled  data for 2,658 publicly-traded  corporations
(including both financial institutions and non-financial institutions)  in Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.  As our starting point
in the data collection, we use the Worldscope database which generally provides the names and
holdings of  large owners. The database has been used in previous studies of corporate ownership
structure (La Porta  et  al. (1997), Lins  and  Servaes  (1998)).  We supplement  the  data with
information from the Asian Company Handbook 1999, the Japan Company Handbook 1999, the
1997 Annual  Reports  of the Hong Kong, Jakarta,  Seoul,  Kuala Lumpur,  and Manila  Stock
Exchanges,  as  well  as  with  ownership  data  from  the  Korean  Fair  Trade  Commission,  the
Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook, and the Singapore Investment Guide.
We exclude companies which have proxy ownership that cannot be traced to a specific owner. In
all cases,  we  collect the  ownership  structure as of  December  1996 or  the  end  of the  1996
accounting year.  We end up with 2,658 companies for which we can trace the ultimate owners,
and where stock market  data are available. Balance  sheet and segment data are available for
2,510 of these corporations.
9Worldscope  adjusts  the  reporting  in  the  income  statement  and  balance  sheets  of
corporations to  make it closer to international accounting standards.  While this  is generally
straightforward for income statement items, the assets and liabilities numbers include different
categories across the nine  East Asian countries.  In  Indonesia,  Japan,  Korea,  and  Thailand,
companies  are not  required to  report intra-group  lending, which  distorts  the  leverage ratios.
Similarly, different tax systems distort the reporting of profits.  We hence use only stock market
data, sales data net of excise taxes, and capital investment data.  The latter two are flow figures
and are not affected by the differences in accounting standards across the nine sample countries.
The database shows consolidated company account data when it is disclosed. Information
on whether the accounts are consolidated is given by  Worldscope in  a field, which  contains
standardized text  such  as  "All  subsidiaries are consolidated,"  "Consolidation  for  significant
subsidiaries, others  are on equity basis,"  and  "No  consolidation,  cost basis."  If  a company
changes its consolidation practice, this change is recorded in the data. Of the 2,658 companies
used in the empirical analysis, 505 companies accounting for  19% of the observations do not
report consolidated statements. Indonesia and Thailand have the most such cases as a percentage
of  the respective country  samples. To  test the robustness  of  our main  results,  we  rerun  all
regressions while excluding firms with unconsolidated statements.
Following on La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999b), we analyze the control
pattern of companies by studying ultimate shareholdings.  In the majority of cases, the principal
shareholders  are  themselves  corporate  entities,  not-for-profit  foundations,  or  financial
institutions.  We  then identify  their  owners,  the  owners of  their  owners,  etc.  We do  not
distinguish among individual family members and use the family group as a unit of analysis. We
divide corporations into  widely-held  and corporations with  ultimate  owners.  A widely-held
10corporation  is a corporation  which  does not have any owners  who have significant  control  rights.
Ultimate  owners  are further  divided  into four  categories:  families  including  individuals  who have
large stakes,  the state, widely-held  financial  institutions  such as banks and insurance  companies,
and widely-held  corporations.
Our study of expropriation  relies on cash-flow rights and control rights. Suppose, for
example,  that a family  owns 11%  of the stock  of publicly-traded  Firm A, which in turn has 21%
of the stock  of Firn B. We would say that the family  controls 11%  of Firm B-the  weakest  link
in the chain of voting rights.  In contrast,  we would say that the family owns about 2% of the
cash flow rights of Firm B, the product of the two ownership  stakes along the chain. To make
the distinction  between cash-flow and control rights, we document pyramiding structures  for
each firm,  cross-holdings  among  firms,  and deviations  from one-share-one-vote  rules.
To better understand the variety of ownership structures that determine the ultimate
control of companies,  we provide an example from our data. The example shows some of the
complications  in the construction  of ultimate  ownership  and the wealth of data that are necessary
to ensure proper tracing of the ultimate  owners  in East Asian corporations. Figure 1 shows the
organizational  structure  of the Lotte  group,  the tenth largest  chaebol  in Korea.  The Lotte group is
controlled  by the Kyuk Ho Shin family  which owns 34% of the voting rights in Lotte Japan,  and
100% of the voting rights in  the Samnarn Foundation, which are in turn the  two largest
shareholders  of the companies  affiliated  with the chaebol. Following  the definition  of ultimate
ownership,  we establish that the Dabnid Ham corporation  (lower right corner of Figure 1) is
controlled  by the Kyuk  Ho Shin family  at the 24% level.  This is because the Samnam  Foundation
controls  21% of the votes in Daehong  Communications,  which in turn controls  24% of the votes
11in Dabnid Ham. In addition, Lotte Japan controls 24% of Lotteria, which controls 13% of the
votes in Daehong  Communications.  The latter ownership chain adds to the level of ultimate
control since the weakest link in the chain now becomes  Deahong which has 24% voting rights
in Dabnid Ham.  The control of Dabnid Ham by the Kyuk Ho Shin family is ensured with only
4%  of the  cash-flow  rights  in  the company,  through  the use  of both  pyramiding  (Samnam
Foundation  controls  Daehong  which  in  turn  controls  Dabnid  Ham)  and  cross-holding  (the
additional votes that Lotteria has in Daehong).
We also study the ultimate  ownership structure of Pusan Finance.  The Kyuk Ho Shin
family has a 39% direct control of Pusan Finance. In addition, Lotte Japan has a 27% control of
Lotte Industrial, which in turn has a significant stake (12%, not reported in the figure) in Pusan
Finance. Surmming  up the two chains of ultimate ownership, the controlling family has 51% of
the control rights in Pusan Finance, while holding 46% of the cash-flow rights.
Figure 1: The Lotte Group
(Immediate Control/Ultimate Cash-Flow Rights)
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12The two  examples  from  Figure  I  show that  ultimate  cash-flow  and  control  rights  are
described both  by  their  level,  and by  the  type of  shareholder.  Table  1 reports  descriptive
statistics on the concentration of ultimate cash-flow and control rights of East Asian corporations
in the hands of the largest controlling holder. Thai corporations display the most concentrated
cash-flow rights,  32.84% on  average, followed by  Indonesian companies,  with  25.61%,  and
Hong  Kong  companies,  with  24.30%.  Japanese  and  Korean  corporations  have  the  least
concentration of cash-flow rights, 6.90% and 13.96% respectively. A quarter of Thai companies
have more than 40%  of the cash-flow rights in the hands of the largest block-holder, while a
quarter of Japanese companies have only 2% of the cash-flow rights in the hands of the largest
block-holder.
The concentration of control rights in the hands of the largest block-holder is similar to
the concentration of cash-flow rights, with Thai and Indonesian companies having the highest
concentration,  35.25%  and  33.68%  respectively,  followed  by  Malaysian  and  Hong  Kong
companies,  28.32%  and  28.08%  respectively.  The  least  concentration  of  control  rights  is
documented in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, 10.33%, 17.78%, and 18.96% respectively (Panel B).
Finally,  Panel C  shows the  ratio  of  cash-flow  to  control rights,  which  is  lowest  in  Japan,
Indonesia, and Singapore, and highest in the Philippines and Thailand.
The differences in the ratio of cash-flow to control rights become easier to explain if we
consider the channels through which  such deviations are made possible  (Table 2).  Deviations
from one-share-one-vote rules are rare across East Asian countries.  On average, control of 20%
of the vote can be received with  19.7% of the cash-flow rights. The variations across countries
are not  significant.  Pyramiding  is more frequently used  to de-couple  cash-flow  and  control
rights. In particular, two-thirds of Indonesian firns  in our sample are involved in pyramiding, as
13are approximately  half of  the  firm in  the sample in  Korea,  the  Philippines,  Singapore, and
Taiwan. The smallest share of firms involved in pyramiding structures is recorded in Thailand.
Finally, 10.7% of the finns in our data have holdings in other firms.  This percentage is highest
for firms in Singapore, Malaysia, and Japan, and lowest for Indonesian and Thai firms.
There are large differences  across countries in  the distribution  of cash-flow and control
rights across ownership categories (Table 3).  Of the 2,611 companies which have at least one
owner controlling 5% of the vote, 1,179 companies, or 45% of the sample, have a family as the
largest  block-holder;  973,  or  37%  of  the  sample,  companies  are  controlled  by  financial
institutions;  and 275  companies,  or 13% of the total,  have a widely-held  corporation as the
largest block-holders.  The remaining companies are controlled by the state.
B.  Measuring performance
We construct an industry-adjusted market valuation measure, following the approach of
Berger and Ofek (1995) and extended by Lins and Servaes (1998)  and Fauver,  Houston, and
Naranjo (1998).  This approach defines the excess value (EXV) of a firm as the ratio of the firm's
actual value to its imputed value. 3 The actual value is measured by market capitalization, the
market value of common equity plus the book value of debt.  To calculate the imputed value, we
first construct industry median market-to-sales ratio for each two-digit SIC code industry using
only  the  single-segment  firms  in  each  country.  The  market-to-sales  ratio  is  the  market
capitalization divided by firm sales.  We then multiply the level of sales in each segment of a
3 The excess  value variable  is often  used to capture  diversification  performance. We consider  it also appropriate  to
use the excess  value as a market  performance  measure  because  it adjusts  (by construction)  for industry  differences
in performance.
14finn  by its corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratio.  The imputed value of the firm
is obtained by summing the multiples across all of its segments.
The financial and segment data of the Worldscope database allow the computation of the
market performance measure.  Similar to the ownership data, historical segment data for many of
the firms  are, however,  missing  from Worldscope.  In such  cases, we  collected the missing
segment data from various  issues of the Asian Company Handbook  and the Japan  Company
Handbook.  All financial data are converted to US dollars using end-year exchange rates. We
exclude a small number of firms from the sample because they do not report segment sales.  For
the remaining firms with complete segment data, we determine the industrial sector(s) to which
they belong and group a firm's  reported segments according to the two-digit Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) system. 4
Table 3 provides  mean and  median statistics  of EXV for the whole  sample and  sub-
groups by types of ownership. By construction the median of EXV is (about) 1.  We find that a
higher degree of cash-flow rights is associated with somewhat higher mean and median EXV for
all type of owners combined (Panel A, column 2).  The relationship does appear to taper off,
however, as the mean and median EXV for the fourth quartile are only marginally higher than
those for the third quartile (1.237 and 1.021 versus 1.231 and 1.012).  Splitting the sample by the
type of owners, we find that for family ownership the relationship between cash-flow rights and
4  This procedure involves two steps.  First, we assign the four-digit SIC codes reported by Worldscope to
appropriate  segments. In the majority of cases we are able to obtain one-to-one  matches  between SIC codes and
segments. For some companies,  the number of reported SIC codes is not the same as the number of reported
segments. If a segment can not be associated  with a reported SIC code, we determine  the segment's SIC code
according  to its business  description.  If a segment  is associated  with  multiple  SIC codes,  it is broken down equally
so that  each segment  is associated  with  one SIC code.  In the second  step,  we redefine  segments  at the two-digit  SIC
level and aggregate  segment  sales  to that  level. Second,  we classify  finms  as single-segment  if at least  90 percent  of
their total sales  are derived  from one two-digit  SIC segment. Firms are classified  as multi-segment  if they operate  in
15EXV is positive, until  the fourth quartile where the mean EXV is less than that of the third
quartile.  For ownership by widely-held financial institutions the relationship between cash-flow
rights and EXV is positive  throughout, while  for ownership by  widely-held  corporations the
relationship appears to flatten out for the second quartile and beyond.  State cash-flow rights and
mean and median EXV are not related in any obvious way.
The raw statistics for control rights suggest that there are some negative costs of block-
holder control as the mean and median EXV are somewhat lower for higher level of control by
all types of owners, but the relationship is not very strong.  It is clearer when breaking down by
the types  of  ownership:  the  costs  of high  control  rights  are  the most  severe for  the  firns
controlled by  families, particularly  so at higher levels of  control.  For the  fourth quartile of
control by families (panel B), for example, the median EXV is only 0.851, the lowest in this
panel.  For control rights by widely-held financial institutions, there also appears to be decline in
median and mean EXV at the third quartile, and the median EXV is only 0.876.  For widely-held
corporations and the state, the relationship between EXV and the degree of with control rights
are not obvious from these raw statistics.
Since cash-flow rights and control rights are correlated, it not obvious what the net effect
of increases in both cash-flow and control rights on EXV might be.  We therefore also calculate
the mean and median EXV for different quartiles of the ratio of cash-flow to control rights (Panel
C).  We find for all types of ownership that the mean and median  are the lowest for the first
quartile, 0.927 and 0.793 respectively, and monotonically increasing with the ratio.  And for the
first quartile of the ratio of cash to control rights for families, the median EXV is only 0.652, the
more than one two-digit  SIC code industries  and none of their two-digit  SIC code segments  accounts  for more  than
90 percent  of total  fimn  sales.
16lowest in this panel.  For widely-held financial institutions, low ratios are also associated with
low values of EXV.  This is not the case for widely-held corporations and the state where there
is no obvious pattern between EXV and the ratio.
These statistics reported in  Table  3 do not  control for other firm-specific or  country-
specific  factors.  Establishing  the  nature  of  the  relation  between  ultimate  ownership  and
performance requires the use of multivariate regression  analysis to which we turn in the next
section.
4.  Evidence of expropriation
We start by regressing market performance (EXV) on cash-flow and control rights for all
type of ownership combined, focusing on the pooled (across countries) results and using linear
relations.  We employ the following linear regression model:
(1)  EXV  =  Intercept  +  bl*CASH  +  b2*CONTROL  +  b3*(CASH/CONTROL)  +
b4*(CASH/CONTROL)*HICONTROL + b5*CES + (Country dummies) + u
where EXV is excess value, CASH is cash-flow rights of the largest block-holder, CONTROL is
the control rights  of the largest block-holder,  CASH/CONTROL is the ratio  of cash-flow to
control rights of the largest block-holder, and HICONTROL is a dummy variable which is equal
to 1 if the control rights for a particular firm are above the median for the particular ownership
type, 0 otherwise.  CES is the capital expenditures over sales ratio,  and country dummies are
used to control for the effects of the economic and institutional environment in each country.  We
employ the ordinary least-square (OLS) method in the regression analysis.  The regressions are
17performed on the full sample (Table 4) as well as country-by-country, but  the latter are not
reported. 5
We  find  that  market  valuation  is  positively  associated  with  higher  investment,  as
measured by capital expenditures over  sales (CES), consistent with  the findings in  Lang and
Stulz (1994).  In other regressions, we also included company size (the natural logarithm of total
assets) and operational performance (net operational revenues) as these have been found to be
significant in other studies.  Neither of these variables was, however, statistically significant in
explaining the cross-sectional variation in market valuation in this  sample.  We consequently
drop them from the sample.
In terms of the effects of ownership structures, we find that higher cash-flow rights by the
largest  control  block-holder  is  positively  related  to  excess  valuation  (Table  4,  column  1)
consistent with the raw statistics in Table 3.  The degree of control rights by the largest block-
holder is, however, negatively related to  excess valuation (column  2), suggesting  that higher
concentration of control rights leads to expropriation of minority  shareholders.  This regression
does not show, however, the overall effects of combined cash-flow ownership and control rights.
Since the two are highly positively correlated, univariate results alone are not sufficient. When
considering the degree of cash-flow rights relative to control rights, regressions results (colurnn
3) show that the negative effect of control rights is maintained as is the positive effect of cash-
flow rights.  This confirms the results of Table 3 that it is the deviations of control from cash-
flow rights  which are associated with  expropriation and which  lead to  the negative effect of
certain ownership structure on market valuation.
sWe  also  run  the  regressions  while  excluding  all  companies  which  report  unconsolidated  statements.  The
qualitative results do not change.
18To further test this hypothesis, we investigate the effect of high control rights, with the
argument that a high level of control rights provides more opportunity for the controlling block-
holder to  expropriate.  We find  (column 4) that there  is an  additional effect  of high  (above
median) control rights relative to cash-flow rights as the coefficient on the interactive variable
CASH/CONTROL*HICONTROL  is  significantly  positive.  As  the  coefficient  on  the
CASH/CONTROL variable has not  changed much, this negative  effect on valuation  of high
control relative to cash-flow rights is in addition to the general negative effect on control relative
to  cash-flow rights on market values.  These findings may be interpreted to suggest that cash-
flow ownership is  associated with higher market valuation, and that  concentration of  control
rights, especially at high levels relative to low cash-flow rights, is  associated with increasing
expropriation of small shareholders.
East Asian corporations are often characterized as family-controlled, which gives rise to
the hypothesis that family ownership leads to the finding of expropriation as these owners have
the most  scope for expropriation.  We therefore study separately the effects of cash-flow and
control rights for corporations where families are the largest control block-holder (Table 5).  The
number of corporations for which family the largest block-holder is 1,158, or about half of our
sample. We find that the effect of family ownership concentration are qualitative very similar to
those found for all classes of ownership combined.  As before, we find evidence of a positive
impact of cash-flow rights, but negative impact of control rights, also relative to cash-flow rights
(columns 1-3).  Especially at high (above median) levels of family control relative to cash-flow
rights market values are lower (column 4).  As most of the coefficients on family are larger in
magnitude than the coefficients for the same variable in case of all ownership classes combined,
19especially the cash-flow rights relative to control rights variable, the results can be interpreted as
evidence that the small shareholder expropriation occurs to a large extent by families.
We next explain  the  existence of  a valuation discount for  the other types  of control
ownership.  Tables 6 and 7 investigate the effects on valuation of firms for cash-flow and control
ownership for those corporations where respectively widely-held financial institutions, the state
and widely-held corporations are the largest controlling block-holders.  Since country-by-country
regressions indicate some important differences for financial institutions in the case of Japan, we
also  include  in  the  regression  a  separate  dummy  for  ownership  by  widely-held  financial
institutions in Japan versus other countries.
We find that cash-flow ownership by financial institutions is positively  associated with
corporate valuation  and that  control rights  are negative associated with  valuations  (Table  6,
columns 1 and 2).  The magnitude of the coefficient on the control rights is somewhat less than
that for family control, but higher than control for all classes of ownership.  We find  further
evidence of expropriation as the coefficient on CASH/CONTROL is positive and significant, and
as  the  coefficient  for  the  interactive  variable  for  high  control  stakes  is  also  positive  and
significant.  The magnitude of the coefficient on the CASH/CONTROL variable is less than for
family control as well as for control for all classes of ownership, suggesting expropriation by
financial institutions is less than that by families.  It appears that the negative effect of control by
financial  institutions  arises  from the role of  financial institutions  in Japan  as  the interactive
dummy with CASH/CONTROL is positive and significant for Japan, but is not  significant for
the other countries (column 5).  This  finding supports the results  in Kang  and Stulz (1998),
which show that Japanese firms whose debt had a high fraction of bank loans in 1989 performed
worse from  1990 to  1993, possibly as Japanese financial institutions  extract a rent from their
20borrowers.  Morck and Nakamura (1999) also find that Japanese financial institutions do not
provide good corporate governance.
In contrast to overall, family and financial institutional control, the association between
state ownership and market valuation is insignificant, regardless of whether cash-flow or control
rights or the ratio between the two are used as independent variables (Table 7, columns 1-3).
This suggests on one hand that state cash-flow ownership has not effect on market valuation, but
on the other hand that state control does not have negative effects either.  It could be that the
usual positive impact resulting from ownership concentration and the negative impact of state
interference on enterprise performance offset each other.  It could also be that the state chooses
its ownership and might have stakes in relatively valuable enterprises, while at the same time
exercising poor corporate governance.
Results  similar  to  state ownership  obtain  for  ownership by  widely-held  corporations
(Table 7, columns 4-6),  where most  ownership variables  are not  significant.  There is some
evidence that  low  cash-flow  rights  relative  to  control rights  is  associated  with  evidence of
expropriation (last column).  This could be due to the ownership structures in some countries,
particularly  Japan  and Korea  where  cross-ownership is relatively  large.  Country-by-country
regressions do not  confirm this, however, as the results  in  expropriation remain  if these two
countries are excluded from the data set. 6
6 Taiwan is the only country where we do not find evidence of expropriation by any type of owner.
216.  Conclusions
This paper  documents the relation between ultimate  ownership  and market  valuation,
differentiating between control from cash-flow rights.  We find that higher cash-flow rights are
associated with  higher market  valuation, but  higher control rights  are associated with  lower
market valuation, especially when cash-flow rights are low and control rights are high.  This
suggests expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders.  Using regressions
for individual ownership classes, we conclude that family control is an important factor behind
the negative  relation between  control rights  and market  valuation.  In  contrast, we  find  no
evidence of expropriation for state control and control by widely-held corporations.  Finally, the
relation between control by financial institutions and market valuation is as for families in the
case of Japan where high control by financial institutions has a negative relationship with market
valuation. We conclude that the risk of expropriation is indeed the major principal-agent problem
for large publicly-traded corporations, as suggested by La Porta et al. (1997).
It  is  likely that  the degree to  which  certain ownership structures  are associated with
evidence of expropriation depends on country-specific circumstances.  These may include the
quality of banking systems, the legal and judicial protection of individual shareholders, and the
degree  of  financial  disclosure  required.  The  exact  magnitude  to  which  these  institutional
variables  affect the degree of expropriation is an  issue of important policy  relevance and  of
potential future research.
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26Table 1: Concentration of Cash-Flow Rights and Ultimate Control
in East Asian Corporations (Largest Control Holder)
The newly-assembled  data for 2,658  publicly-traded corporations (including both  financial institutions  and non-
financial  institutions)  are  collected  from  Worldscope,  the  Asian  Company  Handbook  1999 (1998),  the  Japan
Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the 1997 Annual Reports of the Hong Kong, Jakarta, Seoul,  Kuala Lumpur, and
Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the Korean Fair Trade Commission, the Securities
Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore Investment Guide (1998), and IFR Handbook
of World Stock and Commodity Exchanges (1997). In all cases, the data are as of December 1996 or the end of the
1996 accounting year.
A.  Cash-Flow Rights
Country  Number  of  Mean  Standard  Median  I  st Quartile  3rd Quartile
Corporations  Deviation
HongKong  330  24.30  11.43  18.67  17.43  29.68
Indonesia  178  25.61  12.54  24.00  16.00  34.00
Japan  1160  6.90  8.51  4.00  2.00  10.00
Korea  214  13.96  9.36  10.10  8.29  18.57
Malaysia  238  23.89  11.68  19.68  14.00  30.00
Philippines  99  21.34  11.52  19.22  10.00  28.64
Singapore  212  20.19  10.82  20.00  13.27  29.66
Taiwan  92  15.98  8.76  14.42  10.00  19.27
Thailand  135  32.84  13.51  30.00  20.00  40.00
East Asia  2,658  15.70  13.44  12.00  5.06  22.00
B.  Ultimate Control Rights
Country  Number  of  Mean  Standard  Median  _S  Quartile  3rd Quartile
Corporations  Deviation
Hong  Kong  330  28.08  11.73  20.00  20.00  40.00
Indonesia  178  33.68  11.93  30.00  27.52  40.27
Japan  1160  10.33  7.98  10.00  5.00  10.00
Korea  214  17.78  10.74  20.00  10.01  20.08
Malaysia  238  28.32  11.42  30.00  20.00  30.42
Philippines  99  24.36  11.58  20.00  20.00  30.00
Singapore  212  27.52  11.12  30.00  20.00  40.00
Taiwan  92  18.96  8.57  20.00  10.00  20.00
Thailand  135  35.25  13.36  40.00  29.90  50.00
EastAsia  2,658  19.77  13.65  20.00  10.24  30.00
C.  Ratio of Cash-Flow to Ultimate Control Rights
Country  Number of  Mean  Standard  Median  Ist Quartile  3rd Quartile
Corporations  Deviation
Hong  Kong  330  0.882  0.214  1.000  0.800  1.000
Indonesia  178  0.784  0.241  0.858  0.630  1.000
Japan  1117  0.602  0.376  0.600  0.200  1.000
Korea  211  0.858  0.229  1.000  0.700  1.000
Malaysia  238  0.853  0.215  1.000  0.733  1.000
Philippines  99  0.908  0.201  1.000  1.000  1.000
Singapore  211  0.794  0.211  0.800  0.600  1.000
Taiwan  92  0.832  0.198  0.975  0.700  1.000
Thailand  135  0.941  0.164  1.000  1.000  1.000
East Asia  2,611  0.746  0.321  1.000  0.450  1.000
27Table 2:  Methods Used for Enhancing Control
(full samples, percentage of total)
Deviations  from One-Share-One-Vote  is the average  share of cash-flow  rights necessary  to have 20% control  rights
in a corporation.  Pyramids  with  Ultimate  owners  (when  companies  are not widely-held)  equals 1 if the controlling
owner  exercises  control  through  using  at least one  publicly-traded  company,  0 otherwise;  Cross-Holdings  equals 1 if
the company  has a controlling  shareholder  and owns any amount  of its controlling  shareholder  or another  company
in her chain  of control,  0 otherwise.  All data are for 1996.
Country  Number  of  Deviations  from  One-  Pyrarnids  with  Cross  Holdings
Corporations  Share-One-Vote Ultimate  Owners
HongKong  330  18.8  25.1  9.3
Indonesia  178  19.2  66.9  1.3
Japan  1160  19.9  36.2  11.8
Korea  214  19.5  45.1  9.9
Malaysia  238  18.1  39.3  14.9
The Philippines  99  18.9  41.8  7.3
Singapore  212  19.9  55.3  15.4
Taiwan  92  19.6  50.8  8.4
Thailand  135  19.2  12.1  0.9
East Asia  Nine  2,658  19.7  38.9  10.7
28Table 3: Concentration of Cash-Flow Rights and Ultimate Control
in East Asian Corporations (Largest Control Holder, Mean, Median)
The newly-assembled  data for 2,658 publicly-traded corporations (including  both financial institutions  and non-
financial  institutions)  are  collected  from  Worldscope,  the  Asian  Company  Handbook  1999 (1998),  the  Japan
Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the 1997 Annual Reports of the Hong Kong, Jakarta, Seoul,  Kuala Lumpur, and
Manila Stock Exchanges, as well as with ownership data from the Korean Fair Trade Conmmission,  the  Securities
Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore Investment Guide (1998), and IFR Handbook
of World Stock and Commodity Exchanges (1997). In all cases, the data are as of December 1996 or the end of the
1996 accounting year.  47 companies where no owner controlled 5% or more of the shares were excluded.
A. Cash-Flow Rights
Quartile  Full Sample  Family  Financial  Institution  Corporations  The state
CashFlow  EXV  CashFlow  EXV  CashFlow  EXV  CashFlow  EXV  CashFlow  EXV
Observations  2,611  1,179  973  275  184
1st  2.162  1.062  9.086  1.052  0.861  0.885  9.609  1.189  7.898  1.486
2.000  0.912  10.000  0.892  1.000  0.809  10.000  1.014  9.000  1.027
2nd  7.935  1.212  18.049  1.165  2.757  1.082  20.000  1.403  15.439  1.247
8.000  1.006  20.000  0.992  3.000  0.921  20.000  1.137  16.000  1.001
3rd  18.319  1.231  23.364  1.319  4.759  1.211  29.768  1.319  23.957  1.178
20.000  1.012  22.000  0.997  5.000  1.051  30.000  1.173  22.500  0.877
4th  35.134  1.237  37.469  1.127  12.690  1.330  45.362  1.382  44.516  1.586
30.000  1.021  37.500  0.998  10.000  1.103  50.000  1.055  50.000  1.386
All  16.165  1.181  21.997  1.165  5.318  1.128  26.172  1.317  22.952  1.374
12.000  0.991  20.000  0.973  4.000  0.992  20.000  1.056  20.000  1.016
B.  Control Rights
Quartile  Full Sample  Family  Financial  Institution  Corporations  The  state
Control  EXV  Control  EXV  Control  EXV  Control  EXV  Control  EXV
Observations  2,611  1,179  973  275  184
jst  5.532  1.212  13.942  1.254  4.917  1.173  11.447  1.242  8.377  1.488
5.000  1.026  10.000  1.004  5.000  1.046  10.000  1.058  10.000  1.026
2nd  12.178  1.173  20.000  1.255  5.929  1.174  20.000  1.386  19.352  1.187
10.000  0.984  20.000  0.975  5.000  1.012  20.000  1.138  20.000  0.876
3rd  22.315  1.215  29.963  1.199  10.000  1.038  31.305  1.326  27.609  1.298
20.000  0.995  30.000  0.983  10.000  0.876  30.000  1.088  30.000  0.951
4th  39.084  1.145  43.371  0.957  16.419  1.124  46.096  1.298  46.514  1.523
40.000  0.941  40.000  0.851  10.000  0.978  50.000  1.012  50.000  1.284
All  20.134  1.181  26.796  1.165  9.365  1.128  27.166  1.317  25.463  1.374
20.000  0.991  20.000  0.973  10.000  0.992  20.000  1.056  20.000  1.016
C.. Ratio of Cash-Flow to Control Rights
Quartile  Full Sample  Farnily  Financial  Institution  Corporations  The  state
Ratio  EXV  Ratio  EXV  Ratio  EXV  Ratio  EXV  Ratio  EXV
Observations  2,611  1,179  973  275  184
1st  0.255  0.927  0.484  0.911  0.129  0.839  0.826  1.178  0.641  1.442
0.208  0.793  0.500  0.652  0.194  0.799  1.000  0.983  0.690  0.948
2nd  0.731  1.198  0.869  1.195  0.318  1.062  1.000  1.420  0.965  1.275
0.733  1.011  0.850  0.995  0.300  0.876  1.000  1.054  1.000  1.018
3rd  0.984  1.282  1.000  1.254  0.735  1.295  1.000  1.380  1.000  1.077
1.000  1.026  1.000  1.019  0.750  1.137  1.000  1.173  1.000  0.870
4th  1.000  1.316  1.000  1.302  1.000  1.312  1.000  1.287  1.000  1.703
1.000  1.048  1.000  1.044  1.000  1.086  1.000  1.098  1.000  1.499
All  0.746  1.181  0.745  1.165  0.544  1.128  0.957  1.317  0.901  1.374
1.000  0.991  1.000  0.973  0.400  0.992  1.000  1.056  1.000  1.016
29Table 4:  Cash-Flow Rights, Control Rights, and Corporate Valuation
This table presents the regression results of the relationship between excess valuation (EXV) and the concentration
of cash-flow and control rights.  The independent variables include the level of cash-flow rights (CASH), the level
of control rights (CONTROL), the ratio of cash flow to control rights (CASH/CONTROL), and an interaction term
between the ratio of cash-flow to control rights and a dummy for high control (HICONTROL), where the dummy
takes the value of 1 if control by the largest block holder is above the median control across the full sample. Control
variables include total capital expenditures over sales (CES) and country dunmmies  (Thailand is the numeraire). The
regressions  are performed  on  the  full  sample using the  ordinary  least-square  method.  All  data are  for  1996.
Companies  which  do  not  have  a  block-holder  with  at  least  5%  of  the  vote  or  which  do  not  report  capital
expenditures are excluded.
Explanatory Variable  EXV  EXV  EXV  EXV
Intercept  1.0285***  1.3689***  0.8747***  0.9343***
10.6844  13.9493  7.2723  7.0876
CASH  0.4652***
2.4721
CONTROL  -0.5004***  -0.5793***  -0.8122***
-2.6597  -3.1677  -3.2494




CES  0.0016***  0.0014***  0.0014***  0.0014***
3.1104  2.7995  3.0124  2.9396
Hong Kong  0.1435  0.0647  0.0917  0.1082
1.5047  0.6942  1.1241  1.1786
Indonesia  -0.0604  0.0183  0.0452  0.0617
-0.6857  0.1954  1.1587  1.2734
Japan  0.1177  0.1358  0.0358  0.0310
1.1942  1.4157  0.8574  0.6877
Korea  0.1648  -0.0192  -0.0179  -0.0285
1.4251  -0.1626  -0.1642  -0.2543
Malaysia  -0.0162  -0.0634  -0.0207  -0.0164
-0.1748  -0.6857  -0.2854  -0.1811
Philippines  0.1642  0.0584  0.0687  0.0754
1.5872  0.8758  0.6681  0.7293
Singapore  0.0170  -0.0760  -0.0204  0.0081
0.1596  -0.9865  -0.3987  0.0752
Taiwan  0.2019**  0.0356*  0.0452**  0.0638
2.1405  1.8492  1.9847  1.6589
Number of Observations  2,510  2,510  2,510  2,510
Adjusted R 2 0.0134  0.0127  0.0364  0.0385
8,  **,  and $**  represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.
30Table  5: Cash-Flow  Rights,  Control  Rights,  and Corporate  Valuation
(Ownership by Families)
This table presents the regression results of the relationship between excess valuation (EXV) and the concentration
of cash-flow and control rights.  The independent variables include the level of cash-flow rights (CASH), the level
of control rights (CONTROL), the ratio of cash flow to control rights (CASH/CONTROL), and an interaction term
between the ratio of cash-flow to control rights and a dununy for high control (HICONTROL), where the dummy
takes the value of 1 if control by the largest block holder is above the median control across the full sample. Control
variables include total capital expenditures over sales (CES) and country dummies (Thailand is the numeraire). The
regressions  are  performed  on the  full  sample using  the  ordinary least-square  method.  All  data are  for  1996.
Companies  which  do  not  have  a  block-holder  with  at  least  5%  of  the  vote  or  which  do  not  report  capital
expenditures are excluded.
Explanatory Variable  EXV  EXV  EXV  EXV
Intercept  1.0779***  1.5101***  0.7695***  0.9036***
9.7859  13.4586  5.1785  5.9091
CASH  1.0317
0.4528
CONTROL  -1.0931***  -0.8531***  -0.9255***
-5.0523  -3.9843  -5.3375




CES  0.0034**  0.0035**  0.0035**  0.0034**
2.1491  2.2049  2.1985  2.1857
Hong Kong  0.1086  0.0907  0.0813  0.0797
1.0685  0.8451  0.8488  0.4057
Indonesia  0.0353  -0.0113  0.1314  0.1192
0.8754  -0.1127  1.3489  1.2264
Japan  0.3167**  0.3297  0.2253  0.2003
2.3542  1.4613  1.0501  0.9564
Korea  0.1851  -0.0124  -0.0874  -0.0835
1.2034  -0.4587  -0.5853  -0.5624
Malaysia  -0.0194  -0.1149  -0.0261  -0.0568
-0.4085  -1.1685  -0.5248  -0.6021
Philippines  0.0742  -0.0664  0.0102  -0.0162
0.5563  -0.5241  0.0824  -0.1335
Singapore  0.0607  0.0302  0.0457  0.0655
0.4281  0.9654  1.2365  0.4692
Taiwan  0.1831  0.0256  0.0689  0.0880
1.1124  0.6582  0.6916  0.6172
Number of Observations  1,158  1,158  1,158  1,158
Adjusted R 2 0.0134  0.0267  0.0442  0.0452
*,  **,  and ***  represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.
31Table  6: Cash-Flow  Rights,  Control  Rights,  and Corporate  Valuation
(Ownership by Widely-Held Financial Institutions)
This table presents  the regression  results  of the relationship  between  excess  valuation  (EXV)  and the concentration
of cash-flow  and control  rights. The independent  variables  include  the level of cash-flow  rights (CASH),  the level
of control  rights (CONTROL),  the ratio of cash flow to control  rights  (CASH/CONTROL),  and an interaction  term
between  the ratio of cash-flow  to control rights and a dummy  for high control (HICONTROL),  where the dummy
takes the value of 1 if control by the largest block holder is above the median control across the full sample.
Interactive  terms are also included  between  the ratio of cash-flow  to control  rights (CASH/CONTROL)  and country
dummy  for Japan  (JAP), and a dummy  for the other  eight  countries  (NOJAP).  Control  variables  include  total  capital
expenditures  over sales (CES)  and country  dummies  (Thailand  is the numeraire).  The regressions  are performed  on
the full sample using the ordinary least-square  method. All data are for 1996. Companies  which do not have a
block-holder  with  at least 5% of the vote or which  do not report  capital  expenditures  are excluded.
Explanatory  Variable  EXV  EXV  EXV  EXV  EXV
Intercept  0.7753*  1.4015***  0.8641**  0.8872**  0.5742
1.8976  4.0884  2.4526  2.5795  0.9312
CASH  1.0748***
3.4635
CONTROL  -0.9353**  -0.6789*  -0.9531***  -0.9523***
-2.3804  -1.7842  -3.0580  -3.0624






(CASH/CONTROL)*HICONTROL  0.2658**  0.2596**
2.2716  2.2375
CES  0.0011**  0.0010*  0.0008  0.0008*  0.0008*
2.2849  1.8969  1.5695  1.7397  1.7425
Hong  Kong  0.1350  0.1551  0.1967  0.2362  0.2675
0.3321  0.4290  0.5401  0.6518  0.7376
Indonesia  0.9572  0.8678  0.8764  0.8479  0.8482
0.6738  0.6188  0.6223  0.6027  0.6029
Japan  0.1794  -0.1977  0.0687  0.1037  0.4202
0.6962  -0.5938  0.2040  0.3147  0.6780
Korea  0.4138  0.1812  0.2954  0.2910  0.3465
1.4286  0.4765  0.7795  0.7822  0.8754
Malaysia  0.3932  0.2478  0.2713  0.2374  0.2371
0.7758  0.4403  0.4778  0.4038  0.4037
Philippines  0.1831  0.2526  0.2483  0.3079  0.3133
0.8411  0.7331  0.7187  0.9059  0.9251
Singapore  -0.3027  -0.1288  -0.1390  -0.0797  -0.0758
-0.6248  -0.4271  -0.3046  -0.1738  -0.1653
Taiwan  0.9457  0.6608  0.7433  0.7072  0.7447
1.0822  0.7906  0.8928  0.8657  0.8728
Number  of Observations  895  895  895  895  895
Adjusted  R2 0.0355  0.0273  0.0793  0.0868  0.0863
$, **,  and ***  represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1  percent level respectively.
32Table 7:  Cash-Flow Rights, Control Rights, and Corporate Valuation
(Ownership by the State and Widely-Held Corporations)
This table presents  the regression  results of the relationship  between  excess  valuation  (EXV) and the concentration
of cash-flow  and control  rights. The independent  variables  include  the level of cash-flow  rights (CASH),  the level
of control  rights (CONTROL),  the ratio of cash flow to control  rights (CASH/CONTROL),  and an interaction  term
between  the ratio of cash-flow  to control  rights and a dummy  for high control (HICONTROL),  where the dumnmy
takes  the value  of 1 if control  by the largest  block holder is above  the median  control across  the full sample.  Control
variables  include  total capital expenditures  over sales (CES)  and country  dummies  (Thailand  is the numeraire).  The
regressions  are performed on the full sample using the ordinary least-square  method.  All data are for 1996.
Companies  which do not have a block-holder with at least 5% of the vote or which do not report capital
expenditures  are excluded.
Controlling  Block  Holder  The State  Widely-Held  Corporations
Intercept  1.4482***  1.4262***  1.6086  1.3567***  1.4532***  0.6624*
3.2776  3.4135  1.6182  5.2317  5.5297  1.7354
CASH  0.4319  0.2529
0.5894  0.6482
CONTROL  0.4933  1.0421  -0.3236  -0.3872
0.8119  0.1927  -0.5877  -0.6954
CASH/CONTROL  -0.1734  0.8115**
-0.6355  2.3023
CES  0.0043  0.0043  0.0043  0.0010  0.0018  0.0012
1.0178  1.0162  1.1079  0.9854  1.2458  0.4853
Hong Kong  0.3783  0.3893  0.3288  0.1419  0.1332  0.1398
0.7874  0.8184  0.6762  0.5446  0.5112  0.5365
Indonesia  0.0295  0.0246  -0.0641  -0.0248  -0.0253  0.0137
0.5685  0.1285  -0.1428  -0.1421  -0.3287  0.0483
Japan  -0.2129  -0.2032  -0.2378  -0.2152  -0.2367  -0.2227
-0.7524  -0.5986  -0.5513  -0.8952  -0.9843  -0.9243
Korea  0.4982  0.5127  0.3494  -0.1918  -0.2245  -0.2241
0.9471  0.8967  0.7472  -0.7856  -1.0253  -1.0685
Malaysia  -0.1826  -0.1860  -0.2809  0.0281  0.0291  0.0964
-0.4319  -0.4429  -0.6428  0.3685  0.4985  0.4471
Philippines  -0.3157  -0.3171  -0.4582  0.1603  0.1323  0.1346
-1.4288  -1.3584  -1.0226  0.6118  0.8425  0.7181
Singapore  -0.4203  -0.4358*  -0.5689  0.0562  0.0422  0.0811
-1.3585  -1.8542  -1.4252  0.2471  0.1368  0.3696
Taiwan  0.3795  0.3801  0.3776  -0.3196  -0.3607*  -0.2808
0.8806  0.8799  0.8832  -1.4528  -1.7856  -1.2227
Number  of Observations  183  183  183  274  274  274
Adjusted 2 0.0387  0.0425  0.0841  0.0285  0.0324  0.0346
*, **, and *** represent  significance  at the 10,  5, and 1  percent level respectively.
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